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. Robinson LADB news analyst It was the "mother of all devaluations." That is how the headline in
one local newspaper described the recent devaluation of the Nicaraguan currency from parity with
the US dollar to five-to-one. The devaluation was part of the "paquetazo," the latest economic shock
treatment adopted by the government of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro to stave off the
seemingly endless slide of the Nicaraguan economy, the most crisis-ridden in Latin America. This
time, however, the government was more dramatic. "It has to work; if this plan fails, the government
will go down," a somber Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo told Nicaraguans during a
three-hour television address on March 3. According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Nicaraguan GDP dropped by 5.5% in 1990, bringing the
cumulative decline since 1981 to 17.3%. In the same 10-year period, per capita income declined
40.8%. For over 36 months the country has been experiencing uninterrupted hyperinflation,
which reached 8,500% last year. Nicaragua owes $9 billion to foreign creditors, considered the
highest per capita debt in the world. Seventy percent of all Nicaraguans now live in "extreme
poverty." Structurally, Nicaragua's economic woes are not all that different than those faced by
the rest of Latin America: a bloated public sector with chronic fiscal and external deficits that fuel
hyperinflation and price distortions; plummeting living standards; an outdated and inefficient
productive infrastructure; and, extreme sectoral disarticulation. Nicaragua also faces the same
adverse international economic conditions as other developing nations, i.e., dependent and noncompetitive insertion into the world market, and deteriorating terms of trade for most of its export
products. However, both the historic circumstances of the current crisis, and the political and social
conditions which circumscribe it, make Nicaragua an exceptional case. Nicaragua's productive
infrastructure has been shattered by 10 years of war. The economic damage caused by the USfinanced "contra war" is estimated by United Nations specialists at between $14 and $17 billion.
The total is about eight times the country's GDP, twice the value of its foreign debt, and more
than 30 times the value of annual export revenues. Proportionately equivalent losses to the US
economy would be approximately $25 trillion. While Nicaragua faces the crippling legacy of the
war, it is also a highly organized society, with militant trade union and popular movements keen
on defending their interests and well-versed in social struggle. The government does not have
at its disposal a coercive apparatus able to repress these movements. Economic policymakers in
Nicaragua, unlike their counterparts in countries such as Chile, Peru and Venezuela where popular
struggles originating in economic crises and adjustment programs of the 1980s have been violently
repressed , must take into account the social and political impact of policies without recourse to
coercion as means of implementation. An exceptional case In three-way "concertacion" (social
pact) negotiations last October, representatives of trade unions, the government, and the private
sector called on the world community to consider Nicaragua an "exceptional case," and to provide
special emergency debt relief and reconstruction aid. The "concertantes" and their economic
advisers argued that the war had so shattered the productive infrastructure and drained the country
of resources that economic recovery is simply impossible without a major infusion of external
assistance. They also reached agreement on the need for a stabilization and adjustment program
as the bitter medicine necessary to create a macroeconomic environment for recovery. However,
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 5

LADB Article Id: 067238
ISSN: 1089-1560

the country has not been able to achieve either external or domestic conditions for recovery. The
government has not obtained significant foreign aid and loans, and diverse social sectors have
not agreed on the terms of adjustment. The two are not unrelated. Before Nicaragua can become
creditworthy in the eyes of multilateral lending agencies, government and commercial sources, it
must pay some $360 million in arrears to the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and must also sign a stand-by agreement with
the IMF. In September 1990, the government opened negotiations with the IMF. At that time, it
was clear that only after the government had a track record in adhering to a structural adjustment
program would the Fund approve a stand-by agreement. Similarly, the US Congress approved $300
million in FY1990 economic aid for Nicaragua last May. But aid disbursement has been linked to
a stringent set of conditions regarding the new government's social and economic policies, and in
particular to swift and far-reaching implementation of budget cuts, liberalization measures, and
privatization of the economy. (See Robinson, "When Aid is Not Aid," CAU 10/26/91.) This situation
places tight international constraints on Nicaraguans' maneuvering room in attempting economic
recovery, and conditions the flow of external resources on the standard IMF neo-liberal program
requirements. From concertacion with workers to concertacion with the IMF As they sat down
to "concertacion" negotiations last year, representatives of different socio-economic interests in
Nicaragua were sharply divided over how far and fast adjustment should go, and how the costs
of austerity should be distributed. Behind general agreement on corrective adjustment measures
to reduce deficits and restore price as a mechanism for regulating interaction among economic
agents, are fundamental differences between the logic of the neo-liberal model, on the one hand,
and the positions of the popular sectors on the other. In particular, the two opposing positions
were gradual versus shock treatment adjustment, and the relative role of the domestic market
in the process. The National Workers Front (FNT), with the support of the Sandinista National
Liberation Front, argued for gradual adjustment, stepwise measures to minimize the impact on
workers and the poor, and a series of measures (credit, supply policies, etc.) designed to ensure
the continued participation of domestic producers during a stabilization phase. In contrast, the
US Agency for International Development (AID) and the IMF insisted on the shock treatment
variant, involving a near-immediate elimination of the fiscal deficit and other measures to reduce
demand, such as tight credit restrictions and steeper devaluations. The argument for the complete
neo-liberal shock program is that credit, favorable exchange rates, production subsidies, and other
measures designed to sustain the domestic market fuel deficits, inflation, inefficiency and price
distortion. Thus, piecemeal, gradual adjustment is like pouring water into a bucket riddled with
holes. The Nicaraguan private sector and particularly the rightwing Superior Council of Private
Enterprise (COSEP), in alliance with a coalition of rightist parties , argued during the negotiations
in favor of the AID-IMF position. Moreover, such a program, they insisted, should be accompanied
by more aggressive efforts against the political influence of the Sandinistas, and application of
coercion against those who resist economic shock treatment. The explicit terms of the agreement
that was finally hammered out were gradual rather than abrupt, along with compensatory measures
designed to support wage earners and domestic producers. In signing the Concertacion Agreement,
the government had, in effect, placed more importance on reaching an agreement with workers
than with rightwing political and business sectors. In fact, several sectors in COSEP refused to sign
on, signaling a major split between the government and its right flank, and undercutting domestic
consensus. Nevertheless, the government expected that the accord would notify the international
community that social peace and workers' consent to adjustment had been achieved, and that
external resources would therefore be released. With a copy of the Concertacion Agreement in
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hand, Presidency Minister Antonio Lacayo headed the Nicaraguan delegation to a meeting of Paris
Club creditors in December. Then came a rude awakening: Paris Club member-governments made
no commitments, declaring that all debt relief and new loans would be contingent on reaching an
agreement with the IMF. The lesson for the Nicaraguan government was that satisfying foreign
creditors' demands is more important for economic recovery than agreement or cooperation
among Nicaraguans. In January, Lacayo travelled to Washington to meet with Bush administration
officials, and AID and IMF representatives. According to Lacayo, IMF officials told the Nicaraguan
delegation it needed to "see more evidence that Nicaragua was headed in the right direction," i.e.,
implementation of a more far reaching neo-liberal adjustment program. The Bush administration
made the proposition more attractive by promising an additional $202 million in US assistance
for FY1991, half of which would go to paying interest arrears on foreign debt. Days later, Central
Bank president Raul Lacayo announced in Managua that the gradualist approach to adjustment
would be discarded in favor of a shock program. He said if the IMF gave its seal of approval to this
program by March 25, the pipeline would open for new bilateral and multilaternal aid, as well as
commercial bank credits. "Gradualism," he said, would only cause greater economic deterioration.
The IMF will certify these measures, allowing friendly countries to define their commitments."
The "paquetazo" The shock variant, or the "paquetazo" announced on March 3, involved a 400%
devaluation of the cordoba oro and the phasing out of the old or "common" cordoba; a 200% wage
hike; price hikes of 200 to 300% for foodstuffs and services; a slight reduction in fuel prices; and, an
unspecified number of public sector layoffs. After four years of hyperinflation, the new government
had introduced a parallel currency, the cordoba oro, last July. The new currency, presented as an
economic panacea, was to remain pegged to the dollar. This was to stabilize prices and serve as an
anchor for regulating domestic economic activity in accordance with international prices. The plan,
designed by then-Central Bank president Francisco Mayorga, was predicated on a massive infusion
of foreign assistance to back up the new currency, and speedy economic recovery. The strategy was
to convert the cordoba oro into an indexed currency. While the common cordoba was devalued
from 58,300 per US dollar when the new government took office in April 1990, to 5 million to one
by January 1991, the cordoba oro remained at parity with the dollar. During that time, only a few
hundred million dollars worth of foreign aid entered the country. Mayorga resigned late last year
in the face of the dismal failure of his plan. The cordoba oro indexed the economy to the dollar but
remained over-valued, a dual contradiction which the new measures are intended to reverse. As
a typical neo-liberal response to instability, the new austerity measures have their own internal
logic and technical coherence. They are intented to curb inflation by further contracting demand
and to regain macroeconomic equilibrium by restoring the role of price and reducing liquidity.
However, in this framework, economic common sense is not only recessionary, but is divorced of
social content. In other words, there is no relation between economic efficiency and social welfare,
at least not in the short or medium term. There are two ways to fight inflation: reduce demand
or increase output. According to the neo-liberal logic, demand is to be reduced immediately and
output is to be increased in the medium term. However, in countries such as Nicaragua, a significant
portion of domestic demand is linked to the external market (imports), while the bulk of production
is for the domestic market. The neo-liberal scheme seeks to adjust this desquilibrium, i.e., deepen
the economy's linkages to the world market, which means an expansion of the export sector. The
devaluation is fundamentally aimed at stimulating exports and at dampening the domestic market.
In Nicaragua, as in almost every other Latin American country, this means bolstering the relative
position of agribusiness and of large- and medium-scale private sector producers and merchants
who are directly or indirectly tied to the external market, to the detriment of peasants, workers,
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and small- and medium-scale economic agents producing for the internal market. Theoretically,
over time labor and resources will be absorbed, or "reallocated" to the external sector. Observers
were quick to point to cotton as an example of how big business will be favored by the paquetazo.
Nearly 100% of cotton production is controlled by large- scale agribusinesspersons. Cotton displaced
coffee as Nicaragua's top foreign exchange earner in the 1970s, but deteriorated in the 1980s as a
result of low world prices, and high imported input content. The plan Lacayo presented to the IMF
stresses the recovery of cotton for export (scheduled for harvest in April) as central to economic
recovery. The new policy package means that the value of cotton exports will increase by 500%,
while cotton producers' bank debt in domestic currency will shrink. One local economist estimated
the bonanza at an additional $6 million for 272 cotton growers who control production. (Among the
country's top cotton growers are Presidency Minister Antonio Lacayo, Foreign Minister Enrique
Dreyfus, deputy interior minister Jose Pallais, and several other top Chamorro advisers.) Meanwhile,
workers who pick cotton in the fields earn $0.84 per day. The FNT charged that the paquetazo
violated the Concertacion Agreement. Front spokespersons reject the government's claim that
four months of gradual adjustment failed to bring about economic recovery because during said
period the government failed to meet its commitment to stimulate the domestic market. They point
to the case of small-scale businesses, represented by the National Chamber of Small Industry
(CONAPI). Although CONAPI was promised $10 million in loans, as well as preferential utility
rates, it received virtually no financing during the four-month period. The FNT also emphasized that
stabilization and adjustment measures cannot be grounded on further contraction of employment
of domestic demand, since unemployment already stands at 46%, and the minimum wage barely
covers 25% of a household's subsistence needs. But the devaluation 100% greater than the wage
hike announced on the same day means a contraction in demand of nearly 50%. The paquetazo
sparked a series of work stoppages and wildcat strikes, and the threat of another general strike,
which would have been the third in less than a year. Intense government-FNT negotiations, helped
along by the mediation of former US president Jimmy Carter, led to agreement on March 18 on
a 60-day "truce" to "give the measures a chance." The FSLN issued a communique stating that
"the economic adjustments are necessary, but they should correspond to economic and social
reality." While the national economy must be stabilized and placed on the road to recovery, said the
communique, the interests of the majority of Nicaraguans cannot be ignored. The FSLN asserted
that the paquetazo's major flaws are the absence of credit for small- and medium- scale domestic
productive activities, special social welfare programs, and a more equitable distribution of costs.
Neo-liberalism in Nicaragua Whether the latest economic paquetazo will be aspirin for Nicaragua's
economic migraine remains to be seen. How much, and how soon, external resources flow into
the country will be a critical indicator. Ultimately, the key variable determining its success will be
political and not economic. Focusing exclusively on the external sector, the neo-liberal model seeks
the reinsertion of economies into international financial and commodity markets. In this scheme,
the domestic market is seemingly limited to supplying labor for the external sector. The effects of
the paquetazo the closure of inefficient national industry, the bankruptcy of small-scale agricultural
producers and artisans, and the layoff of tens of thousands of workers, sets Nicaragua up as a
supplier of a huge, cheap labor pool. With the liberalization of the economy, and plans for dutyfree zones and new foreign investment regulations, the Nicaraguan government hopes to reinsert
the national economy into the world market as a new export platform. The Nicaraguan experience
reflects an issue of importance to the rest of Latin America. On the one hand, when demand far
exceeds output over a sustained period, such as in Nicaragua, the result is not only inflation, but
severe macroeconomic distortions which cripple production. On the other hand, trade unions and
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popular orgnizations call for a increased domestic production, rather than contracting domestic
demand. Reducing demand to match output can and does result, literally, in starvation and death for
workers and the poor in general. The backdrop to Nicaragua's economic migraine are broader issues
of the viability of economic models in Latin America, and the limited choices posed by dependency
on US- dominated financial and commodity markets. Being an "exceptional case" does not mean
that this country is set apart. Rather, it means that Latin America's economic dilemmas in the 1990s
are highlighted in Nicaragua.

-- End --
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